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A critical feature of the secrecy provisions is their failure to supersede the Espionage
Act. The authors make a detailed and informative study of the overlap between the two
laws and argue convincingly that this is a serious defect in the new legislation. We are
told: "If, therefore, Section io(b)(6) is so construed that the Espionage Act remains
in force for private research as well as governmental activities, the scientists have, indeed, sustained a crushing defeat and the more moderate and enlightened information
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act are little more than pietisms." As an offsetting
factor, however, the book reminds us that the Act does a relatively discriminating job,
having made a bad initial assumption as to the desirability of control; for the ordinary
nuclear scientist its chief impact may be the inconvenience of securing clearance from
the Commission on borderline publication questions and the awkwardness of being a
bit skeptical of his friends.
We are inclined in the end to accept the authors' estimate that "the -information
section of the Atomic Energy Act is principally significant as symptom and warning."
It seems probable at the moment that the chief discouragement of scientific inquiry
will come not from the Act's additions to the law of treason and the catalogue of capital
crimes, but from procedures outside the scope of the Act, such as those of Congressional
investigating committees, and from the emergence of an unfortunate technique of government by defamation.
HARRY KALVEN, JR.*

The United Nations. By Herbert Vere Evatt. Cambridge: The Harvard University
Press, r948. Pp. 154. $2.50.
The United Nations Organization from its very inception has been criticized as
being inherently incapable of keeping the peace.' Dr. Evatt in his book, which is a
revision of the 1947-48 Holmes lectures delivered at Harvard Law School, does not
attempt to meet this criticism. He accepts the institution as given, traces its formation,
describes its structure and operation, and makes proposals for interstitial reform. He
speaks with distinction and with special authority derived from his important role in
the formation and operation of the organization. His book, which is fresh and nontechnical, should interest a wide audience.

Nevertheless, there are several aspects of Dr. Evatt's work which invite criticism:
i) He tends to overstate the importance of the changes in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals which were made at San Francisco. 2) His optimism about the organization's
prospects, although perhaps an occupational necessity, is not justified either by an
a priori analysis of the Charter 2 or an objective examination of the organization's
record.3
3) He gives excessive attention to the formal veto power within the Security Council
and formal methods for circumventing it, but does not give enough attention to the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.

'See Schuman, The Dilemma of the Peace-Seekers, 39 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 12 (1945);
Borchard, The Impracticability of "Enforcing" Peace, 55 Yale L.J. o66 (1946); Meyer, Peace
,or Anarchy (1947). Although Mr. Schuman dealt with the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals his
argument is equally applicable to the Charter.
2Note i supra.
3 See Hamilton, The United Nations at Work, 37 Yale Rev. 88 ('947).
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de facto veto power outside of the Council which results both from the existing distribution of physical power and the basic character of the United Nations Organization
as a loose league of "sovereign" states.
The United Nations is divided into three sections: i) the formation of the United
Nations, 2) the work of the organization, and 3) its future. In the first section, Dr.
Evatt finds that the preparation of the final Charter and its predecessor, the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, before the war had ended, had a significant effect on the character
of the final product. The Charter, however, reflected first the new and peculiar distribution of military power which emerged out of the war, 4 and secondly a careful
attempt to avoid domestic political opposition, particularly in the United States.s
These factors would have been at least as influential during the postwar period, and it
seems unlikely that the Charter would have been fundamentally altered had it been
drafted after hostilities had ended. Conceivably, the courtesy veto to some of the
weaker powers, such as China, might have been omitted if the Charter had been
drafted after the Japanese surrender. Similarly, Russia's successful bid for three votes
in the General Assembly might have met stiffer United States resistance. It is, however, difficult to see how such modifications would have materially affected the general
character of the resultant organization or the course of events since its establishment.
Dr. Evatt describes the San Francisco Conference largely in terms of the clashing
points of view of the large and smaller powers. He emphasizes that the broad veto
power, which he considers the vital flaw in the Charter, remained intact only because
the great powers smothered small power opposition by making the veto the price of
any international organization. He applauds the persistence of "Australia and other
nmn major powers"6 in the successful fight to broaden the authority of the General
Assembly to discuss and recommend. Here he rides his thesis too hard. There were
major powers who joined with Australia in this fight. It was Senator Vandenberg, as a
member of the United States delegation, who phrased the slogan-the General Assembly should be the "town meeting of the world"-a slogan which became the battle
cry of Dr. Evatt and others urging the expansion of the Assembly's authority. In fact,
during the San Francisco debates, Dr. Evatt generously acknowledged the Senator's
support, stating: "I want to conclude... by paying tribute to Senator Vandenberg,
who from the first was a keen advocate of the widest powers of discussion and criticism
by the Assembly ... 7
It is this expanded authority of the Assembly, which, as Dr. Evatt tells us, has been
the legal basis for the creation of the Little Assembly and the Greek Investigating
Commission, and for the recommendation of the partition of Palestine--developments
4 See Millis, The United Nations Charter and Peace, 35 Yale Rev. 14, 21 (1945).
s Ibid., at 15-i8.
6Italics added.
7 United Nations Conference on International Organization 192, 209 (1945). It is an amusing and possibly a significant measure of the nationalism of the "internationalists" to compare
Dr. Evatt's and Hamilton Fish Armstrong's allocation of credit for the expansion of the
Assembly's authority at San Francisco. The latter tells us that this expansion resulted from
one of the "toughest fights" of the American delegation at San Francisco. Armstrong, Calculated Risk 54 (1947).
8The legal basis for the enforcement of the Palestine partition would have been strengthened if the partition resolution had made it clear that the General Assembly was discharging
the responsibility for approving changes in the mandate which had been conferred on the
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which reveal an attempt to redistribute responsibility for the maintenance of security
from the veto-ridden Security Council to the General Assembly.
Dr. Evatt describes other changes in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals which were
stimulated by the smaller nations. He tells us, for example, that the Economic and
Social Council was to be a very weak organ under the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. He
finds that the pledge by members in Article 56 of the Charter "to take joint and separate action to promote full employment and higher living standards" greatly strengthened the economic provisions of the Charter. It is, however, difficult to see how this
ambiguous pledge will advance international economic collaboration. Good resolutions
to achieve full employment are no more meaningful than resolutions for promoting
happiness. They formalize agreement on an end which is universally accepted as desirable while they are silent on the crucial problem of what constitute appropriate
means.
Even though stronger rhetoric was incorporated in the Charter's economic and social provisions, the apparent grant of additional authority was largely nullified by the
amendment to the domestic jurisdiction clause, which was proposed by Australia and
was embodied in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter.9 Under the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals the domestic jurisdiction clause was a limitation only on the pacific settlement of disputes by the Security Council,1° and did not bar discussion or recommendations regarding national economic policies. In the Charter, the clause was transposed
so as to limit all the activities of all the organs of the United Nations.x As a result,
the organization was apparently denied authority to recommend changes in the
economic policies of particular countries, e.g., tariff policy,, on the ground that particular policies do not promote "full employment," etc.

2

In the second section of The United Nations Dr. Evatt looks for "some underlying
causes" of the organization's failures. He refers principally to the failure to conclude,
League Council. Benjamin V. Cohen, The United Nations and Palestine, N.Y. Herald Tribune,
p. 22, col. 6 (March 17, 1948); see resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations,
dated February 12, 1946, part C., U.N. Yearbook 1946-47 i1, and resolution of General
Assembly of League, dated April 18, i946. Ibid., at 575.
1 9 That paragraph provides, in part, as follows: "Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter;.. ." See Goodrich and Hambro, Charter of the United
Nations

72

(r946).

1oDumbarton Oaks Proposals, c. vii, Sec. A, par. 7; Goodrich and Hambro, op. cit. supra
note 9,at 72.
x Ibid.
- Dr. Evatt states (at 132) that "the Economic and Social Council [may] ...examine the
extent to which members of the United Nations have carried out such specific obligations as
the pledge to promote full employment and higher standards of living." It is not cear whether

"examination," i.e., inquiry and investigation, would be considered "intervention" within the
meaning of Art. 2, par. 7 of the Charter. It does seem clear that Art. 2, par. 7 was intended to
block the organization from criticizing national economic policies which were not the subject
of international agreements. Goodrich and Hambro, op. cit. supra note 9,at 75; Dept. of
State, Report to the President on the results of the San Francisco Conference 43-44 (1945);
Kelsen, Limitations on the Functions of the United Nations, 55 Yale L.J. 997, ioo6 (1946).
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outside of the United Nations Organization, peace treaties with Germany, Japan, and
Austria. The unsuccessful treaty negotiations, as well as the failure of the organization,
are, of course, bound up with the larger conflict between Russia and the West. If we
are to reach the "underlying causes" of the organization's failure, we must wrestle
with the forces which have generated the larger conflict. There are no easy answers
here, and we can sympathize with Dr. Evatt's decision not to explore the questions,
given his official responsibilities and the limitations of a short book.
Dr. Evatt briefly evaluates the work of the various organs of the United Nations
and points to the difficulties which have prevented further progress. The "failure of
the Security Council to discharge its responsibility" Dr. Evatt attributes principally
to an "excessive and almost irresponsible use of the veto" by Russia. In an illuminating
analysis of the deliberations within the Council, Dr. Evatt shows how the veto has
been exercised "either in circumstances when the vital interests of the Soviet Union
were not affected or in apparent breach of understandings given at San Francisco by
the Great Powers." He traces the use of the veto by Russia to exclude applicants for
admission to the organization and criticizes the Russians for introducing extraneous
considerations, such as the applicant's neutrality during the war or the fact that the
applicant does not maintain diplomatic relations with Russia. He is also critical of the
Soviet practice of "block-booking"-withholding favorable Soviet action on some applicants until the admission of other applicants is recommended.
The United States and the United Kingdom have not been as blameless in these
matters as Dr. Evatt's silence implies. When the petition of Albania, the first applicant
for admission, was before the Security Council, both the United States and the United
Kingdom not only "expressed doubt as to whether the Albanian Government was
peace loving and able to carry out the obligations of the Charter," but also "pointed to
the fact that their governments did not maintain diplomatic relations with the government of Albania."'3 Similarly, the United States at one stage of the discussion on admissions proposed that all of a group of applicants be admitted en bloc; after the defeat of this proposal, it opposed the admission of particular applicants within the
group.x4
The criteria of admission-a peace-loving state, able and willing to carry out the
Charter's obligations-are, of course, extremely nebulous.S Dr. Evatt treats them as
if they were subject to precise and objective application. Given such criteria and the
Soviet fear that the General Assembly is a forum for building up an anti-Soviet bloc,
it is to be expected that Soviet voting on admissions will involve an estimate of the
applicant's probable voting alignment. Nor is it clear (or to be expected) that the
United States and United Kingdom have disregarded this factor. The whole procedure
for admission to the United Nations Organization is an invitation to maneuver for
future voting power. 6
13 The quotation is from a summary of Council deliberations set forth in the U.N. Yearbook
1946-47, at 415.
X4Ibid., at 414, 421.

S See Kelsen, Membership in the United Nations, 46 Col. L. Rev. 391, 393 (1946).
x6The League procedure was much more satisfactory. Art. x of the Covenant named certain
non-signatories who could accede to the Covenant by depositing a declaration with the
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Dr. Evatt finds that the work of the Assembly, although suffering from blemishes
such as propaganda in debate and voting blocs, has been successful. The basis of this
judgment is not dearly set out, and the reader may wonder whether Dr. Evatt is not
a very indulgent father when he approaches the Assembly's work. He tells us that
"not only does the Assembly help to shape world opinion, it is shaped by world opinion." However, given the barriers to the free flow of information and the never-ending
stream of national propaganda, the Assembly often can preach only to the converted.
World opinion is, moreover, elusive, if not mythical, at any time, and particularly
when the world is split in two. In any event, it would be helpful in connection with an
evaluation of the Assembly's work to have some evidence of the impact of its action
on national policies. On the other hand, it would also seem desirable to consider the
failure of certain member nations to comply with Assembly recommendations which
they find uncongenial. South Africa's noncompliance with the resolutions regarding
the treatment of Indians17 and Argentina's with the Spanish resolution' 8 come to mind
as instructive examples of the limitations of "world opinion." Dr. Evatt's silence on
these matters is in sharp contrast with his attack on Soviet non-cooperation with the
Assembly and the other organs of the organization.
He points to the preliminary discussion of the Palestine question as evidence of the
Assembly's success. The developments which occurred after the publication of his book
but which were foreshadowed by the stubborn imperatives of the struggle for power
require a reversal of this judgment. They are a reminder that international "moral
pressure" unsupported by power does not override deeply held local convictions or the
corresponding local policy. Such convictions are, or can be rationalized into, an expression of national morality; and in a contest between national and international morality, the cards are stacked against the latter. This is not intended to suggest that the
Assembly is doomed to complete ineffectiveness. It is intended to suggest that the Assembly's action will affect important policies of a member nation only if there is power
in the background or if there is in existence within the member nation a strong and
like-minded group whose position will be strengthened by Assembly action.
In the final section of his work, which deals with the future of the Organization, Dr.
Evatt renews the suggestion which he fought for at San Francisco, that the veto be
excluded from pacific settlement of disputes and be limited to enforcement action.
Since Soviet opposition' 9 bars the adoption of this proposal, he argues that "other
members of the United Nations must look elsewhere for the best available means for
insuring that the United Nations takes what action it can in the field of international
peace and security." The new focus is the expansion of the functions of the veto-less
General Assembly. Dr. Evatt applauds this expansion as it is reflected in the AsSecretariat. The admission of states, colonies, etc., not so named required a two-thirds vote of
the Assembly.
1X73 U.N. Bull. 525 (1947).
18

U.N. Yearbook 1946-47, at

13o;

New York Times, § i, p. 8, col. 4 (Dec. i7, 1946).

x9See the statement of Mr. Vishinsky during the opening debate in the General Assembly
on Sept. 17-19, 1947 in U.N. Document, A/P. V. 82-85 (Sept. 17-19, 1947), partially repro-

duced in Padelford, Current Readings on International Relations, No.

3, 217

(1948).
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sembly's establishment of the Greek Investigating Commission and the Little Assembly. With respect to the latter, he adds the caveat that "it may be so weak that it
will tend to reduce the status of the Assembly itself."
These subsidiary organs are, of course, an understandable response to Russian
vetoes. Dr. Evatt properly dismisses the Soviet charge that their establishment is
"unconstitutional." Nevertheless, he does not indicate what they can accomplish in
the face of the fact that they have been boycotted by the Soviet group. They purport
to rely on "moral pressure," but the boycotting nations have denied their moral authority. They may, of course, further solidify, or gain new adherents for, the antiSoviet bloc, but it is doubtful that a majority in the Assembly is much more effective
for this purpose than debate, followed by a Soviet veto, in the Security Council. Whatever role these new instruments of the Assembly may play, it seems clear that they
merely reflect and institutionalize the gap between Russia and the West; they do not
bridge that gap. They may foreshadow an attempt to build a new "security" system
without and against Russia; they do not appear to strengthen the existing system.
Dr. Evatt's discussion of the veto, its amendment, and its circumvention, is concerned mainly with the legality of the new organs and with the rhetoric of majority
rule. This rhetoric may be persuasive and comforting to Americans who can generally
rely on the familiar 9-2 majority against the Russians in the Security Council. It is
not surprising that the Russians, quite apart from any theoretical insistence that the
"unanimity principle" reflects the realities of power distribution, respond differently.
They can "justify" the veto because of immediate practical considerations. It protects
their satellites"° against adverse recommendations approved by an unfriendly majority
in the Council. The veto question is obviously not an abstract debate about majority
rule but is another engagement in the cold war.
If we look more closely at the Charter and the existing distribution of physical
power, the engagement does not seem to be an important one. There is no legal obligation on the part of member nations to comply with recommendations concerning
pacific settlement,2' whether these recommendations are made by the Security Council
or the General Assembly. There is no right on the part of the Organization to compel
such compliance.- A Council recommendation is simply a consolidation of general
sentiment. Although this interpretation has been criticized as destructive of the authority of the United Nations"3 it appears to be required by both the language and the
legislative history of the Charter.24
The proposed change in the veto, although it might increase the number of Council
recommendations, would not increase their legal or practical significance. Each nation,
20 A permanent member of the Security Council may not formally veto a recommendation
of pacific settlement in a dispute to which it is a party. See Charter, Art. 27, par. 3; Goodrich
and Hambro, op. cit. supra note 9, at 125 (1946).
21Goodrich and Hambro, op. cit. supra note 9, at 152, 153.
-Ibid.; see also Hearings before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Charter of
the United Nations, 79th Cong. ist Sess., at 278-79 (1945).
23Benjamin V. Cohen, The United Nations and Palestine, New York Herald Tribune,
p. 26, col. 6 (March 16, 1948).
24 Notes 19, 2o supra.
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whether or not represented in the Council, would still have a de facto veto over adverse
recommendations. The veto of the Palestine partition exercised by the Arabs and/or
the United States is an instructive example.2S Whether the de facto veto would be
exercised in a given case would depend on subtle calculus by a nation prejudiced by
the recommendation and in a position to prevent compliance. The immediate and
direct impairment of its position resulting from compliance would be weighed against
the "goodwill" cost of flouting the organization's recommendation.
Generalizations about the varying responsiveness of different nations to international "moral" pressure are dangerous, particularly when the pressure seems to be
going largely in one direction. But since proposals to change the veto have been stimulated by, and are directed at, the practices of Russia and her satellites, we may note
that these countries appear to have rather tough hides. Even if Russia could not prevent uncongenial recommendations by the use of the formal veto within the Council,
she could often prevent compliance with these recommendations by the use of the
de facto veto outside the Council.
The crucial veto problem results from the retention of right and power by each
member of the United Nations Organization to exercise the de facto veto after the
Council has made its recommendation. Formal or informal exclusion of the veto from
the field of pacific settlement would not touch this problem. The problem is inherent in
the basic character of the United Nations as a league of "sovereign states," each one
of which is legally and physically immune to coercion by the organization designed to
effect compliance with the Organization's recommendations for pacific settlement.
In addition to the exercise of the restraint in the use of the veto, Dr. Evatt makes
some sound, although necessarily general, proposals for procedural revisions, the improvement of the secretariat, bolder participation by the Secretary-General in the
work of the Organization, the avoidance of duplication by the various committees,
commissions, and specialized agencies which have mushroomed in the international
economic and social field, the expansion of world economic statistics, and the avoidance
of propaganda in United Nations debate.
He concludes with an admission of the secondary character of all of his proposals:
They cannot "lead to a substantial improvement in the work of the United Nations so
long as there are suspicion and lack of good will and understanding among its members,
particularly several major powers." He properly implies that the United Nations Organization can do very little to achieve this understanding. The conclusion, unstated
in his book, but underscored by the headlines, is that the Organization has only the
remotest relevance to the current search for international peace and security.
BERNAPm D. MELTZER*
Patterns of Union-Management Relations. By Frederick H. Harbison and Robert
Dubin. Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1947. Pp. ix, 229. $3.75.
Analysis of labor-management relations has lately entered a new stage of development as a result of group planning of research projects that is now taking place in re25 There was, of course, an assembly recommendation in the Palestine case, but its legal
consequences are no different from those of a recommendation by the Security Council.
26 See Carr, The Twenty Year Crisis, Chap. 9, esp. p. 213 (1939).
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.

